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Cowdery, David Whitmer, and Martin Harris appear to follow creedal Christian be-
liefs. So do the eleventh chapters of Alma and 3 Nephi. However, the LDS church
distinguishes itself from creeds, reformed Christianity, and closed-canon traditions.
Claiming Christianity, denying creeds, and modifying canons create tension. Sev-
eral issues complicate matters further. A third of LDS faithful are first generation
(68). Many carry over theologies from their former affiliations. Also, the faithful
of all traditions seem able to embrace denominational doctrines in a partial or selec-
tive way. Campbell et al. note that the LDS encourages private contemplation of pol-
icy in direct dialogue with God (44).
A collateral issue has to do with the LDS’s conscious effort to be a world religion.
Mormon theology, which advances claims of people and events during the axial age,
rests on revelation from 1830 of the common era, without artifacts to evince these
claims prior to 1830. Absent as well from LDS history are the rich, lengthy oral tra-
ditions preceding the written canon that give sacred texts precision from decades
and centuries of revisions before a single word marks a scroll.
Axial-age sacred texts identify characters with their social and personal traits. A
Homeric epic features a character named “Hated One,” whom Poseidon hates. The
HatedOne’s wife, Knitter, knits. The villains have names like Talkstoomuch and Against-
knowledge. Gilgamesh features a creature made of mud named Mud. Likewise, the
Old Testament has righteous kings named Righteousking, creatures of dirt named Dirt,
and patriarchs who were rich and powerful named Father Brahman and Tsara. They
named their son Chuck (Isaac) because they chuckled. The New Testament has a savior
named Savior ( Jesus), and the majority of given names reflect devotion to God or vo-
cational trades. Platonic dialogues, as well, match personal traits to characters. There
is a critic named Critic, a reasonable man named Ruledbyreason, a war leader named
Warleader, a smart man named Head, and an orator named Elatedoration. By com-
parison, Book of Mormon names are less transparent. Its writing style is cumbersome
and reads like attempted replication rather than axial-age accumulated knowledge
gathered over decades and even centuries. None of these issues are permanent road-
blocks between Mormonism and Christianity. The five or six Trinitarian moments in
the Book of Mormon allow for readings consistent with Christianity if the LDS lead-
ership decanonizes it.
Campbell et al. have written a fine book. Readers will experience a sense of grav-
itas as they read it. Its vocabulary seems defensive, using phrases such as “suspicion,”
“accuse,” and “racially resentful.” We non-LDS must emphasize that, whatever pre-
cisely the LDS faithful are, those who have not enjoyed their company in the weight
room, on the racquetball court, in their congregations, in their homes, and in the
halls of academia have lived a bit less richly.
DAVID E. DIXON, California State University, Dominguez Hills.
GAMWELL, FRANKLIN I. Existence and the Good: Metaphysical Necessity in Morals and Pol-
itics. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011. x1209 pp. $75.00
(cloth).
The relations between religion and theology, on the one hand, and metaphysics
and politics, on the other, remain controversial. Philosophers and political theo-
rists continue to debate the legitimacy of the presence of religion in the public
sphere, whereas postmodern theologians are busily developing “post-onto-theological”
forms of religiosity, leaving behind old-fashioned ontological baggage, including the-
ism as a metaphysical thesis. Franklin Gamwell’s book contributes to both debates
The Journal of Religion
568
This content downloaded from 128.214.147.060 on March 03, 2020 04:26:25 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
and many others. It defends a strong claim, maintaining that theism plays a funda-
mental role not only in metaphysics but also as the foundation of morality and dem-
ocratic politics. Writing in the process-theological tradition of A. N. Whitehead and
Charles Hartshorne, Gamwell develops a processual theism within what he calls “neo-
classical” metaphysics. The volume is welcome especially because of its uncompro-
misingly unorthodox approach: few serious scholars today maintain, as Gamwell
does, that “democracy itself can be vindicated only on theistic grounds” (2)—though
Gamwell admits that this need not be explicitly recognized as a condition of demo-
cratic citizenship (14).
Gamwell’s argument is too thick and complex to be properly summarized in a
brief review. Its structure is, however, clear. The first chapter examines general meta-
physics of existence, defending the neoclassical alternative—although Gamwell’s
discussion of different approaches to metaphysics is by no means as exhaustive as
one might hope. The second chapter extends this approach to the metaphysics of
subjectivity, attacking Martin Heidegger’s views. The third chapter arrives at God
and theistic metaphysics, while in the fourth chapter the author introduces the
“metaphysics of human purpose” needed for ethics based on the notion of the “com-
prehensive good.” The two final chapters explore the metaphysics of democracy, at-
tempting to demonstrate that democracy and justice need backing from the kind of
metaphysics developed in the earlier chapters.
Gamwell’s conception of metaphysics is sharply critical of Kantian and post-Kantian
conceptions. For Gamwell, metaphysics amounts to a “critical study of what must be
the case because the complete absence of existence is impossible,” that is, a “critical
study ofwhatmust be the casebecause somethingmust exist” (4; see also 30–31).Thus,
from the denial of the possibility of there being mere nothingness, a whole metaphys-
ical system is derived, culminating with moral teleology and democratic justice. Meta-
physical necessity is a key concept here. Metaphysics examines the necessities that need
to be postulated on the grounds that it is impossible that there is nothing. Given the
centrality of this idea in Gamwell’s project, I find it odd that no substantial discussion
of contemporary analyticmetaphysics of necessity and possibility is included: no refer-
ences to leading modal metaphysicians such as D. M. Armstrong, Saul Kripke, David
Lewis, and E. J. Lowe are provided. (Nor, for that matter, is theological literature cov-
ered in any depth.)
Formulating his metaphysical arguments in terms of necessary conditions for
possibilities we must take for granted, Gamwell also labels his project “transcenden-
tal metaphysics” (7). This I find problematic; it is, rather, the Kantian examination
of the metaphysical features of humanly constructed reality that deserves the label
“transcendental.” Gamwell’s system integrates transcendental argumentation with
a relatively strong form of metaphysical realism; such an integration is, inevitably,
full of tensions. Moreover, the metaphysical foundation of the system seems to be
too good to be true: if God’s existence, divine and human purposes, the compre-
hensive good, and ultimately ethics and politics (etc.) could really be soundly de-
rived from the meaninglessness and (thus) impossibility of “nothing exists,” then one
might suppose that such an argument would already have been discovered by meta-
physicians. In Gamwell’s process-metaphysical and -theological terms, “the impossibil-
ity of sheer nothing entails the necessity of the world (themetaphysical society of frag-
mentary actualities) and the necessity of God (themetaphysical society of all-inclusive
actualities)” (73).
Gamwell’s metaphysics is “transcendental” because metaphysical statements “ar-
ticulate what must be the case because ‘something exists’ is necessarily true” (59).
However, usually transcendental inquiries investigate necessary conditions for the
possibility of something we find actual but contingent, such as cognitive experience
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(e.g., in Immanuel Kant) or linguistic meaning (e.g., arguably, in Ludwig Wittgen-
stein). Astonishingly, then, Gamwell calls “transcendental” a system of metaphysics
that the key classic of transcendental philosophy, Kant, would not have accepted
as properly transcendental. Hence, Gamwell’s concept of transcendentality itself is
pre-Kantian (or evenmedieval) rather than post-Kantian. (See also, however, his dis-
cussion of the principle of communicative respect as “transcendental”; 123ff.)
Gamwell’s concluding formulation of neoclassical theism is also theologically in-
teresting: “As the metaphysical individual, God is literally the one ‘in whom we live
and move and have our being’; our relation to God defines our very existence in the
world and thus our presence as creatures who act to make a difference” (92). There-
fore, it is unsurprising that God plays a major role in ethics and politics. Religious
activity, Gamwell explains, is needed to represent our communion with the divinity
empowering us to strive for our metaphysical purpose (126). God alone “gives ulti-
mate worth to human purpose” and authorizes democracy and justice (177).
Religion, in Gamwell’s definition, is “a cultural formation or set of concepts and
symbols and associated communal practices in terms of which or through which its
adherents explicitly affirm as decisive an understanding of their relation to exis-
tence as such” (128; cf. 159). While Gamwell carefully and insightfully argues against
proposals to justify democracy without any recourse to metaphysics, and while we
may agree with him that the political importance of religions lies in their convictions
about “the ultimate terms of political assessment” (159) and attempts to represent
“what is presupposed in all human practice” (163), I find it hard to follow him to
the conclusion that democracy and justice are based on theism. Showing where he
goes wrong would require a demonstration of a flaw in his overall complicated argu-
ment. Being unable to engage in such an exercise here, I simply rest my case on the
observation that themethodology ofmetaphysics allegedly deriving substantial princi-
ples concerning mind-independent reality from conceptual assumptions (such as the
claimed impossibility of sheer nothingness) was alreadyheavily, andplausibly, attacked
by Kant and his followers.
SAMI PIHLSTRÖM, University of Helsinki.
GRASSO, CHRISTOPHER. Skepticism and American Faith: From the Revolution to the Civil
War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. ix1649 pp. $34.95 (cloth).
In this erudite andmeticulously researched book, Christopher Grasso sheds light on
the role of freethinking, deism, and irreligion in American culture between inde-
pendence and the Civil War. Challenging the notion that the United States was
“the Western world’s exception to the secularization and disenchantment that was
commonly thought to define modernity” (5), Grasso shows how the dialogue be-
tween religious faith and skepticism shaped peoples’ beliefs and practices in the early
republic.
Divided into four parts and thirteen chapters, the book begins by exploring late
eighteenth-century debates between deists and Christians about the place of orga-
nized religion in civil and political life. Christians deployed notions such as “com-
mon sense” and “self-evident truths” to defend their faith from the skeptical scrutiny
of the deists (26–27). Many argued for the inseparability of Christian morality and
public virtue: they “likened ‘the propagation of deism’ to treason” (128), showing
“‘infidel philosophy’ to be a dangerous social and political threat” (47). The deists,
in turn, appealed to the inherent rationality and liberty of human beings, calling for
a society based on reasonable self-interest. Describing rival attempts to improve ed-
ucation andhealth care alongwith calls for women’s emancipation andworkers’ rights,
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